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Abstract With the increasing use of different types of
auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’
behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the
main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated
power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of
the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale elec-
tricity market as a restructured electric power industry and
model how the participants of the market bid in the spot
electricity market. The problem is formulated analytically
using the Nash equilibrium concept composed of large
numbers of players having discrete and very large strategy
spaces. Then, we compute and draw supply curve of the
competitive market in which all generators’ proposed pri-
ces are equal to their marginal costs and supply curve of the
real market in which the pricing mechanism is pay-as-bid.
We finally calculate the lost welfare or inefficiency of the
Nash equilibrium and the real market by comparing their
supply curves with the competitive curve. We examine 3
cases on November 24 (2 cases) and July 24 (1 case), 2012.
It is observed that in the Nash equilibrium on November 24
and demand of 23,487 MW, there are 212 allowed plants
for the first case (plants are allowed to choose any quantity
of generation except one of them that should be equal to
maximum Power) and the economic efficiency or social
welfare of Nash equilibrium is 2.77 times as much as the
real market. In addition, there are 184 allowed plants for
the second case (plants should offer their maximum power
with different prices) and the efficiency or social welfare of
Nash equilibrium is 3.6 times as much as the real market.
On July 24 and demand of 42,421 MW, all 370 plants
should generate maximum energy due to the high elec-
tricity demand that the economic efficiency or social wel-
fare of the Nash equilibrium is about 2 times as much as
the real market.
Keywords Nash equilibrium  Lost welfare  Bidding
strategy  Genetic algorithm  Iran wholesale electricity
market
Introduction
The deregulation of electric power industry in Iran and
many parts of the world is based on auction mechanism.
For example, market participants in Iran wholesale spot
market (a day-ahead electricity energy marketplace estab-
lished in Iran) tender supply and demand curves for the
day-ahead and hour-ahead energy markets in format of
sealed bid. The spot market then constructs aggregated
hourly supply and demand curves to determine market
clearing prices (MCP). The importance of simulating bid-
ding strategies of electricity markets can be investigated
from several points. First part is related to the importance
of comparison between actual results and optimal results
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way, market designers are continually trying to compare
the present system and structure with efficiency criteria.
Extraction between present deviations and observed dif-
ferences is an appropriate tool to improve the market per-
formance. Another importance of issue is related to
participants’ strategies in the market. Generating compa-
nies require an appropriate theoretical and computational
tool to bid an appropriate price and quantity to the market
to evaluate accurately and increase profitability.
Song et al. (2003) proposed the new method of con-
jectural variation model (CV) and its application in elec-
tricity markets. The conjectural variation-based bidding
strategy model helped generators to improve their bids and
maximize their profits. Kian and Cruz (2005) have evalu-
ated development of biddings in a dynamic multipolar
electricity market. They took the electricity market as a
non-linear dynamic system and modeled it using Nash
discrete bidding strategies. Swider and Weber (2007) pro-
posed a Bayes strategy for the strategic bidder while the
others’ behaviors are modeled with a probability distribu-
tion. Gao et al. (2008) proposed two approaches to deter-
mine market bidding strategies by the support vector
machine. Accuracy of methods was examined with an
example.
Borghetti et al. (2009) proposed an analysis about the
selecting process of the generators bidding strategies with
regard to some constraints. This analysis was performed
both for a simple approach of static game theory and for a
cost-minimization unit-commitment algorithm using com-
puter-based method. Bompard et al. (2010) used the linear
supply function to find the Supply Function Equilibrium
(SFE). They proposed a new and efficient approach to
determine supply function equilibriums in the limited power
markets by finding the best slope of the supply function with
changing the intercept. Gong et al. (2011) have done a
complete literature analysis on the state-of-the-art research
of bidding strategy modeling methods. Chunhua et al.
(2012) made the benefit/risk/emission comprehensive gen-
eration optimization model with objective of profit maxi-
mization and bidding risk and emissions minimization
according to the coordinated interaction between generating
companies’ outputs and electricity market prices.
Nojavan et al. (2013) have identified the optimal bidding
strategy in day-ahead market using the Information Gap
Decision theory. At bidding time, criteria such as generator
characteristics and market price uncertainties that have a
direct effect on the expected profit and the supply curve
must be considered. Gap information decision-making
indicates that risk aversion and risk taking will impact on
the expected profit and the supply curve. The mentioned
method has been applied to an unrealistic case study.
Soleymani (2013) introduced a method to analyze the
competition among companies with limited power
transmission and incomplete information. In that method,
supply function equilibrium was used for optimal strategies
modeling of energy market participants and the Expected
Function Equilibrium (SFE) was used to create an offer in
the reactive power market. Finally, an experimental system
was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the model.
Mahmoudi et al. (2014) proposed a game theoretical model
to show how plants maximize their utilities in each energy
source by considering the government role in the compe-
tition of two power plants. Hafezalkotob et al. (2015)
proposed a novel robust data envelopment model (RDEA)
to investigate the efficiencies of decision-making units
(DMU) when there were discrete uncertain input and out-
put data. To illustrate the ability of proposed model, a
numerical example of 38 Iranian electricity distribution
companies was investigated. The results revealed that the
RDEA model was suitable and reliable for target setting
based on decision maker’s (DM’s) preferences when there
are uncertain input/output data.
Sadjadi et al. (2015) presented an integrated decision
model based on recent advances of geometric programming
technique that managed Joint pricing and production. The
demand of a product considered as a power function of factors
such as product’s price, marketing expenditures, and con-
sumer service expenditures. Furthermore, production cost
considered as a cubic power function of outputs. Mousavi
et al. (2015) presented some metaheuristic algorithms to
simulate how generators bid in the spot electricity market
viewpoint of their profit maximization according to the other
generators’ strategies, such as genetic algorithm (GA), sim-
ulated annealing (SA) and hybrid simulated annealing genetic
algorithm (HSAGA) and compares their results. The results
of the simulations showed that GA outperforms SA and
HSAGA on computing time, number of function evaluation
and computing stability, as well as the results of calculated
Nash equilibriums by GA are less various and different from
each other than the other algorithms.
As seen above, main studies are performed based on the
technical procedures and solely with the market simulation
purpose. Studies are more based on the use of metaheuristic
algorithms in development of computational models than
the theoretical basics. Using various algorithms is the main
advantage of these researches. On the other hand, the
proposed methods have limited applications due to the
required large size of data that are inaccessible. Modeling
and simulating bidding strategies in a real and large market
have not been performed yet. Moreover, the lost welfare
measure or inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium in a real
energy market has been rarely considered. So, the objec-
tives of this article are:
• Simulating Nash equilibrium of a real market with
many participants.
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• Comparing the efficiency of the uniform pricing
mechanism versus the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism
in a large wholesale electricity market.
• Calculating the deadweight loss of a real market such as
Iran wholesale electricity market.
In addition, the assumptions of this article are:
• There is at least a Nash equilibrium in the deregulated
power industry.
• The efficiency of the uniform pricing mechanism is
more than the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism in a large
wholesale electricity market.
• The lost welfare of a real market such as Iran wholesale
electricity market is computable.
In this paper, game theory and the Nash equilibrium are
used as the theoretical basis of evaluation. This study tries
to simulate the bidding strategy in Iran electricity market as
a large electric power industry with about 370 generating
units by relying on the mentioned principles and finally
determine the Nash equilibrium of this real and large
market. In addition, it intends to compute the lost welfare
on the Nash equilibrium with uniform pricing mechanism
and the real market with the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism
and compare them to understand which pricing mechanism
is more efficient. There are many challenges about pricing
mechanism in researches by Son and Baldick (2004)
Skoulidas et al. (2002). We practically examine the effi-
ciency of them.
Implementation of proposed algorithm uses huge
information to calculate Iran electricity market. Accord-
ingly, implementation of this model is practically
impossible for all days and we have to limit the modeling
execution time. Hence, two specific models that charac-
terize the minimum and maximum demand of Iran’s
market are considered as two applicable examples. Mar-
ket has faced maximum demand on July 24, 2012 with
demand of 42,421 MW per hour and has faced the min-
imum demand on November 24, 2012 with demand of
23,487 MW per hour demand. These 2 days in 2012 have
been selected for Nash equilibrium simulation. According
to the information of the units (Iran Grid Management
Co. 2012a, b), we compute the real supply curves of the
market on July 24 and November 24, 2012. In addition,
we compute and draw the competitive supply curves for
two mentioned hours using the information like marginal
costs of the generators that have been gained from the site
of Iran Grid Management Co. (2012a, b). Then, we
compare the lost welfare (efficiency) of the resulting
equilibrium with the real supply curve by calculating the
area between the competitive supply curve and each
curve. The bigger area shows more lost welfare and less
efficiency. We use the genetic algorithm, due to the
simulation of real markets for the large number of par-




The spot market is only the real-time market (Stoft 2002).
In a spot market, the seller delivers its production imme-
diately and the buyer pays for it ‘‘on the spot’’. (Kirschen
and Strbac 2004). In the electricity market, two principal
models of energy trading are considered:
• The spot market
• The bilateral agreements
Models are recognized by the bid matching processes
and the price setting mechanisms. The concept of spot
market is used as the basis for the modeling of a general
competitive market structure. It provides the solution for
specifying the optimal bidding strategies (Beck et al.
2008). The trading process of the spot market consists of
following steps (Kirschen and Strbac 2004):
• Generating companies submit their bids that are
ordered pairs of the proposed prices and quantities to
supply certain amounts of electrical energy for the
period under consideration. These bids are ranked in
order of increasing price. From this ranking, the supply
curve of the market is built.
• Similarly, the demand curve of the market is made by
asking consumers to submit offers specifying quantities
and prices and ranking these offers in decreasing order
of price. Since the demand for electricity is highly
inelastic, the demand curve is assumed to be a vertical
line at the value of the load forecast.
• The intersection of these supply and demand curves
shows the market equilibrium. All the bids submitted at
a price lower than or equal to the market price are
accepted and producers are allowed to produce the
amount of energy corresponding to their accepted bids.
Similarly, all the offers submitted at a price greater than
or equal to the market price are accepted.
• Generators are paid the market price for every mega-
watt-hour that they produce, whereas consumers pay
the market price for every megawatt-hour that they
consume, irrespective of the bids and offers that they
submitted. Generally electricity is traded as a quantity
of energy at a certain price during a specific time period
(1, 1/2 h).
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Pricing mechanisms: uniform and pay-as-bid
The purpose of the energy auction and determining the
prices is the optimization of both buyers’ and sellers’
general satisfactions. The main constraint in this optimiz-
ing problem is the equality between demand and supply in
the market clearing. The amounts of generators’ produc-
tions and consumers’ consumptions with their corre-
sponding prices are the output of this problem. After the
optimization, the process of payment is done according to
one of the methods of uniform or pay-as-bid pricing.
The procedure shown in Fig. 1 is based on the
assumption that all market participants (generators) being
used in the uniform pricing mechanism, receive the same
price. They all receive the Market Clearing Price (MCP) or
market price. Single-price energy auctions are the most
widely used methods in electricity markets in the world.
Another alternative is to use a pay-as-bid procedure that
means all participants being used, receive the price they
bid, not the MCP. The procedure is shown in Fig. 2
(Wangensteen 2005).
Indexes and parameters
The following indexes are used in the proposed model:
i Number of generators (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .;Nf g)
j Number of individuals/number of joint strategies (in
this article, each generator can propose 3 strategies.
Therefore, there are 3N joint strategies or individuals)
h Number of strategies that each generator can bid (In
this article, each generator can propose 3 strategies)
The researchers consider the following parameters:
MCGi Marginal cost of generator i
PGi Proposed price of generator i
QGi Proposed quantity of generator i
Pcap Price cap of electricity market
QmaxGi Maximum generation capacity of
generator i
QminGi
Minimum generation capacity of
generator i
Ui Set of available strategies of player i
(each strategy contains an ordered pair
of PGi and QGi )
ui The specified strategy played by
player i
u~ Vector of all generators’ strategies
(joint strategy: u~¼ u1; u2; . . .; uNf g)
U The finite set of strategies (in this
article, each generator can propose 3
strategies. Therefore, there are 3N
vectors of strategies in U)
JGi u~ð Þ The profit of player i from the joint
strategy of u~
J u~ð Þ Generators’ joint profit
Di An absolute value of difference
between the gained profit in the
current configuration j and the
possible maximized value of the profit
for player i
D uð Þ ¼ Fabsj ¼ Dj Cost (objective) function (sum of the
differences between amounts of profit
obtained in the current configuration
(joint strategy:u~) with the maximal
possible amount of profit for each
producer. It is equal to
P
i Di)
Frelativej Relative fitness value of individual j
MCP Market clearing price
pih hth proposed price of generator i
qih hth proposed quantity of generator i
fih Fitness of hth generator i’s bid
HR Generators’ heat rate (kcal=kW h)Fig. 1 Uniform pricing mechanism
Fig. 2 Pay-as-bid pricing mechanism
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wfuel Generation unit cost for fuel
consumption (Rial=kcal)
wSO2 Generation unit cost for emission of
sulfur oxide (Rial=kcal)
rSO2 Emission rate of sulfur oxide for
generation unit
wNO Generation unit cost for emission of
nitrogen oxide (Rial=kcal)
rNO Emission rate of nitrogen oxide for
generation unit
CostO&M Maintenance variable cost of each unit
(Rial=kW h)
Optimal bidding strategy/Nash equilibrium
Constraints of generators’ profit maximization
In the new deregulated environment, generation companies
are free to charge any price for electricity they offer into the
market taking into consideration some limits. Those limits are
defined often by the regulatory and preventive measures like
for example price cap (Pcap). Many electricity markets
incorporate a price that is called ‘‘price cap’’ designed to
prevent large price spikes (Kirschen and Strbac 2004). A price
cap may be charged for a commodity. Price caps are used to
prevent gouging during times of short supply or to limit price
increases to a certain level. Price of bidding shall not be higher
than this upper price limit specified by the market operator
(MO) (Beck 2008). However, each generation company will
solve its own profit maximization problem to get the benefit
and the optimal generation schedule for the units. In this work,
the principal actors are assumed to be the power producers
selling the energy on a centralized market place. The objec-
tive of the optimization is to maximize the individual profit
value. The profit (or payoff) of bidding generator JGi is
computed in the following way:
JGi ¼ Pmarket  QGið Þ  CGi  QGið Þ ð1Þ
where Pmarket is the MCP, QGi is the quantity of power the
generator Gi is scheduled to produce and CGi  QGið Þ is the
cost of energy production. Every generation company has
an objective to maximize this profit from selling energy. To
maximize the function mathematically we must take the
derivative from both parts and equate them to 0:
oJGi
oQGi








For a case of perfect competition, market price does not
depend on the quantity of a single generator and so the




Then, the optimal price offer will be equal to the mar-
ginal cost of production:
Pmarket ¼ oCGi QGið ÞoQGi
¼ MCi ð4Þ
Since the perfect competition is an idealistic case, the
real bidding price will normally be defined between mar-
ginal cost (MC) value and Pcap and will depend on the time
of delivery and demand volume:
MCGi PGi Pcap ð5Þ
In addition, for every single hour the bidding quantity
should satisfy the general production limits.
QminGi QGi QmaxGi ð6Þ
Equilibrium of supply and demand in each market is








Assuming that the participants in the game theory are
rational, their strategies are directed with their profits. So,




ul x; lð Þ ð8Þ
In Eq. 8, x is the set of possible choices for person l, l is
a set of parameters that are out of control and ul is his
utility function. In the game theory, strategies that are in
interest of the person depend on the strategies of other
players (opponents). So, we can say that l is the selected
strategies of the opponent and x is the selected strategies of
player l and ul is his consequence. As a result, a player’s
decision-making problem in the game theory is as follows:
max
sl2Sl
ul sl; slð Þ ð9Þ
In this equation, sl is the combination of selected
strategies of all players (opponents of player l) except
player l. The key difference between these equations is that
in Eq. 14, player l does not know choices of opponents
(sl). But in the previous case, l is known to the person.
So, choosing the best strategy (sl 2 Sl) in the game theory
is required to simultaneously analyze each player’s deci-
sions against his opponents.
Nash equilibrium will occur according to the following
conditions:
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• Players will select their strategies with the most
consequence regarding to their belief about their
opponents.
• Players’ belief should be correct. It means that the
opponent practically chooses the strategy that is in
player’s belief. Mathematically, the combination of the
strategy of s ¼ s1; s2; . . .; sn













Generators’ joint profit maximization
The complexity of the problem of optimal bidding strate-
gies is when each generator’s profit (payoff) associates
with other generating companies’ bidding strategies toge-
ther. In this research, Nash equilibrium is used to solve this
problem. Therefore, the problem changes from each gen-
erator’s profits maximization to simultaneous generators’
profits satisfaction and Nash equilibrium occurs when none
of the participants is unilaterally reluctant to the change of
the equilibrium and the solution. Mathematically, opti-
mizing problem of the generators’ profits is considered as a
search problem of vector u~ that causes to maximize the
function.
u~¼ u1; u2; . . .; uN½  2 U ð11Þ
J u~ð Þ ¼ JG1 u~ð Þ; . . .; JGi u~ð Þ; . . .; JGN u~ð Þ½  ð12Þ
The vectors u~ P;Qð Þ are N market generators’ strategies
that are extracted from a finite set (U). The vector u~ is equal
to the proposed prices and the relevant quantities of pro-
duction for all generators.
Generating units’ short-term marginal cost
Much research has been done about costs of plants. For
example, Kumar et al. (2015) have analyzed the cost of a
coal-fired power plant using the NPV method. To calculate
the MC of generating companies, Mansur (2008) has
introduced the following equation that indicates the short-
term marginal cost of generation for each year of power
plant:
MC ¼ HR  wfuel þ wSO2  rSO2 þ wNO  rNO þ CostO&M
ð13Þ
where HR is the generator’s heat rate (kcal=kW h). wfuel,
Wfuel wSO2 and wNO are, respectively, generation unit costs
for fuel consumption, emission of sulfur oxide and emission
of nitrogen oxide (Rial=kcal) and rSO2 and rNO are equal to
emission rates of generation unit and also CostO&M is the
maintenance variable cost of each unit (Rial=kW h). As
generators in Iran do not pay attention to the social costs in
their bidding process, the costs of emission of sulfur oxide
and emission of nitrogen oxide need not be considered in
Eq. 13 (Nazemi et al. 2011). Therefore, short-term MCs of
generators in Iran are achieved by Eq. 14.
MC ¼ HR  wfuel þ CostO&M ð14Þ
Power plants’ fuel consumption and HR for every unit
are extracted from the document of ‘‘Detailed statistics of
power generation in Iran’’ (Tavanir Expert Holding Com-
pany 2013). As the plants use several fuels (gasoline, fuel
oil and natural gas), fuel consumptions of generation units
are formulated in the marginal cost formula as the weighted
averages. We use the energy balance document to specify
the fuel prices of plants (Ministry of Energy 2013).
Formulation of the problem
In this article, we are evaluating the generators’ profits
based on the market clearing price (market price). Getting a
set of bids in which all generators gain satisfactory profits
is the aim of this simulation. As mentioned above, the most
important characteristic of Nash equilibrium is that the
participants’ selection in it does not necessarily make the
most payoff (Abdoli 2011). In this situation, all generators
gain a satisfactory profit. So, we are searching the Nash
equilibrium instead of the maximization of every genera-
tor’s profit. This goal happens when each participant
mutually changes his bid until it has no incentive to change
its decision. According to the characterization of Nash
equilibrium in games, Nash equilibrium search from point
of the minimizing objective function on a joint strategy
space changes to an optimization problem. Consider game
G with N players ( 1; 2; . . .;Nf g). In this game, Ui repre-
sents the set of available strategies of player i. ui is equal to
the specified strategy played by player i and u~¼
u1; u2; . . .; uNf g is a joint strategy for N players. The profit
of player i from the joint strategy of u~¼ u1; u2; . . .; uN is
equal to (Ji uð Þ). In such situation, the definition of Nash
equilibrium for game G is as follows:
Combined strategy of u ¼ u1; u2; . . .; uN
 
will be the
Nash equilibrium for game G if we have for all i 2





2; . . .; u

N
  Ji u1; . . .; ui1; ui; uiþ1; . . .; uN
  ð15Þ
We define the equilibrium search function D uð Þ : U ! Rþ
as a function on the combined strategy space of U
(U ¼ U1  U2      UN) to identify this equilibrium
(Beck et al. 2008):
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Ji u1; . . .; ui1; ui; uiþ1; . . .; uNð Þ  Ji uð Þ
 
ð16Þ
Our purpose is to minimize Eq. 10. If U is not Nash
equilibrium, D uð Þ will be positive and otherwise will be
zero. Joint strategy of u will be an equilibrium for the
game if D uð Þ is zero. The above-mentioned function
calculates the difference between payoff (profit) in the
current situation and the maximal possible payoff for each
producer. In this paper, optimization problem of bidding
strategies in the electricity market for a particular period is
generally as follows:


















Minimizing the lost welfare
Social welfare
In an ideal market the optimization problem refers to the
problem of social welfare maximization. The aim of the
Market Operator (MO) to meet the maximal demand at the
minimal price corresponds analytically to maximization of
the area between aggregated demand D Qð Þ and supply
S Qð Þ curves in Fig. 3. The intersection of supply and
demand curves gives a market price that is often called
market clearing price or system marginal price (SMP).
The surface CS below D Qð Þ is defined as the consumer
surplus and the surface PS above S Qð Þ is the producer
surplus. The social welfare is nothing else but the total
surface between curves D Qð Þ and S Qð Þ.
Social Welfare ¼ CS þ PS ð18Þ
The function that maximizes the surface between D Qð Þ
and S Qð Þ is called social welfare function.
Social Welfare function ¼ max r D Qð Þ  S Qð Þð ÞdQ ð19Þ
Minimizing lost welfare or maximizing economic efficiency
Farrel (1957) defined the enterprise efficiency as generat-
ing an amount of output that was sufficiently more than a
predefined amount of input. With this definition, he intro-
duced several types of efficiency such as production effi-
ciency, allocative efficiency and economic efficiency.
Economic efficiency ¼ Allocative efficiency
 Production efficiency ð20Þ
In general, the lost welfare is usually due to lack of
production and allocative efficiencies. In the short-term
wholesale electricity market, allocative efficiency is not
considered. Because in a wholesale market, the supply side
includes generators and the demand side are distribution
companies. Accordingly, the demand curve is approxi-
mately vertical and without elasticity. This problem is
caused by two reasons:
• The end consumer does not pay attention to the
wholesale market price. Because the end consumer
encounters with the electricity retail market and
restructuring has not been realized in this market,
consumers face predetermined and adopted prices.
Accordingly, consumers will not react to them by
increasing the prices.
• Companies who developed the demand side of whole-
sale market should guarantee to supply electricity to
consumers in every price (Mansur 2008).
Therefore, Fig. 3 changes to Fig. 4:
Accordingly, to investigate the economic efficiency
(social welfare) in short-term wholesale market, evaluation
of production efficiency is sufficient. If the competitive
market is independently able to operate and market price is
achieved from the intersection of the supply and demand
curves, social welfare will have the maximum value (Kir-
schen and Strbac 2004) and this market will have the
maximum economic efficiency. So, in the short-term
Fig. 3 Social welfare
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wholesale electricity market where the demand curve is
approximately vertical and without elasticity, the amount
of difference between result of Nash equilibrium curve and
supply curve in state of perfect competition in which the
price of plants’ bids are equal to their marginal costs rep-
resents the lost economic inefficiency of Nash equilibrium
or lost welfare. In comparing supply curves of the real
market of Iran with the Nash equilibrium, each of them
which its curve has less distance with the curve of the
competitive market is more efficient.
Structure of the game
This paper presents a static game with complete informa-
tion. As we are analyzing bidding strategies in the spot
electricity market for an hour, this game is static. In
addition, the information about HR, wfuel, fuel consumption
for each generator and any information to achieve MCs of
plants are published (Ministry of Energy 2013). In addition,
the maximum and minimum quantities of production of
any generators are available (Iran Grid Management Co.
2012a, b). The price cap is also known. Therefore, each
generator can get the space of other competitors’ payoff
(profit). So, we can assume it as a static game with com-
plete information. Nash equilibrium is the solution of this
kind of game.
Genetic algorithm
The concept of the spot market is used as a base to model
the structure of competitive markets. This concept presents
a solution for the problem of dispatching in auctions and
proposes the optimal bidding strategies in the electricity
market. In this paper, we are facing the problem of Nash
equilibrium calculation with the large number of generators
that each generator has a set of specific strategies from
quantity and price of electricity generation. Solving such a
combinatorial problem by single enumeration has a com-
plexity which grows exponentially with the number of
players. The solution of this problem is based on the Nash
equilibrium characteristics to search the minimizing func-
tion and relying on the metaheuristic methods is used to
find the minimums. In this paper, we use the genetic
algorithm (GA). GA is an oriented stochastic optimization
technique that moves gradually towards the optimum point.
This algorithm is applicable to every problem without any
information about the problem and any restrictions on the
type of variables. Its efficiency in finding the global opti-
mum point has been proved. Capability of this method is in
solving complex optimization problems in which either
classical methods are not applicable or they are not reliable
to find the global optimum (Fogel 2000).
Crossover
Crossover operator performs the partial exchange of char-
acteristics (genetic material) between two individuals
selected randomly from the current population. Therefore,
newly created individuals inherit the characteristics of both
‘‘parents’’. Position(s) of crossover is defined randomly. In
this research, we use both simple crossover and double
crossover by applying a roulette wheel. Figure 5 shows an
example of a simple and a double crossover.
Mutation operator
Mutation introduces random modifications in the popula-
tion, it helps preserve the diversity and prevent the algo-
rithm from the premature convergence. It is performed on a
single individual by modification of one value in a chain of
characters according to some probability that tend to zero.
It can improve the fitness of individual or deteriorate it.
Figure 6 shows an example of a mutation.
Fig. 4 Social welfare in short-term wholesale electricity market
Fig. 5 Crossover
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Configuration of market bids
Every individual contains the information related to the
operation of the spot market, more precisely the vector of
‘‘price-quantity’’ bids and the fitness function’s vector. An
individual in the population is a string of length N, where N
is a number of participants/generators in the market. The
individual represents a unique bid configuration, where the
offer h of the producer i (i 2 1 : N½ ) is defined by a couple
of price and quantity (pih, qih). Each individual of the first
population is initialized randomly from the given list of
parameters. By analogy, the individual h contains N offers.
Individuals evaluation (fitness function)
Absolute fitness value (Fabsj )
In this work, we assume the framework of mandatory spot
market where active participants can bid strategically
above there marginal costs. An intersection between an
aggregated offer curve and a demand produces a uniform
spot market price (MCP) and a scheduled quantity of
power for each generator (qi). The quality of individuals in
the population is evaluated according to the profit output of
the market clearing process. In our case, we have adopted
function D as an objective function of genetic algorithm
that estimates the remoteness of the current solution from
an optimal one. It measures the obtained payoff value of
each participant that is an output of market clearing pro-
cess. It calculates the sum of differences between values of
payoff obtained in the current configuration with maximal
possible value of payoff for each producer.
Di ¼ Jmaxi  Ji ð21Þ
where Jmax is calculated over the set of possible bid’s
variables (price and/or quantities) given the market bids of
other players.





So, Di is an absolute value of difference between the
profits obtained in the current configuration j and the
possible maximized value of the profit for player i. The
absolute value obtained by summing up those individual
profit values Di indicates the remoteness of current solution
from an ideal one, where everyone could maximize its
profit.




It is clear that our objective is to minimize (Fabsj ):
minFabsj ð24Þ
Individual who has the fitness equal to zero (D = 0) will
satisfy the Nash equilibrium.
Relative fitness value (Frelativej )
To apply the operators of genetic algorithm we must be
able to order the individuals according to their quality. To
evaluate an individual within the population, the relative
fitness value of each individual is calculated.






Relative fitness estimates fitness and suitability of
individual j with respect to other individuals by following
probability:





This study evaluates the uniform spot day-ahead electricity
market. Each configuration of bidding indicates one of the
individuals in the genetic algorithm. Bids are arranged
based on merit order rank and will produce the market
supply curve. Intersection of supply and vertical demand
curves shows uniform market output and price. Generators
are able to change their bids to maximize their profit. This
repeated process is implemented by genetic algorithm. The
procedure of single-period market has been shown in
Fig. 7.
Results and discussion
Iran electric power industry
In Iran like many countries, the conceptual and general
scheme of Iran’s electricity industry restructuring is
adopted in 2002 with the ultimate goal of increasing the
productivity to participate the private sector, provide nec-
essary resources for development of appropriate investment
simultaneously the consumption growth in power industry
and according to the second and third country’s develop-
ment policies. The following features are the most char-
acteristics of Iranian electricity market:
Fig. 6 Mutation
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• The model of Iran’s electricity market with respect to
the size of energy exchanges is wholesale model and
competition in the retail level has not already been
activated.
• From the point of the time frame of implementation, the
electricity market of Iran is day-ahead market.
• Payments mechanism to sellers is based on the pay-as-
bid mechanism.
• The mechanism of receiving from customers is based
on the same method.
• Rate of energy in the electricity market has a minimum
price and a price cap. The amounts paid to the
generators are determined by the amount of actual
produced energy provided to the network. Bidders are
allowed to propose energy supply curves in the
ascending steps and maximum to 10 steps. If these
prices are accepted in the electricity market, payment to
units will be based on the bidding not on the maximum
accepted price (Bank Meli Iran Brokerage Co 2012).
Of course, practical studies about biddings of generating
units in Iran indicate that the majority of them offer their
biddings in one step (maximum generation) or two steps
(minimum and maximum generation rates) (Iran Grid
Management Co. 2012a, b).
Implementation of Iran electricity market
Implementation of proposed algorithm uses huge infor-
mation to calculate Nash equilibrium in Iran electricity
market. Accordingly, implementation of this model is
practically impossible for all days and we have to limit the
modeling execution time. Hence, two specific models that
characterize the minimum and maximum demands of
Iran’s market in 2012 have been considered as two appli-
cable examples. On July 24, 2012 with demand of
42,421 MW per hour, market has faced maximum demand
and on November 24, 2012 with demand of 23,487 MW
per hour demand, market has faced the minimum demand.
These 2 days in 2012 have been selected for Nash equi-
librium simulation. In regard to absence of renewable
power plants in the electricity market of Iran, the amount of
demand satisfied by renewable plants is deducted from the
Fig. 7 Procedure of single-
period market
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amount of demands. Some of the electricity demand that is
provided by the other countries is deducted from the total
demand. Accordingly, the amount of electricity market
demand on July 24 and November 24 are, respectively,
37,361 and 22,164 MW per hour.
Number of allowed plants for bidding on July 24 is 370
units and on November 24 is 319 units. Study of bidding
files of Iranian plants indicates that most of the generating
units offer just one or two bids and certainly one of them is
equal to their maximum power generation. Accordingly, in
this article, each plant is allowed to offer three fixed bids as
an ordered pair of price and quantity (one of them is equal
to maximum generation, and rest of them will be offered
randomly). By selecting a random bid (strategy) from each
of the generation unit, a set of strategies will be created.
For example, it is possible for the first unit to select the
third strategy and for the sixth unit to choose the second
strategy. After arranging these strategies according to the
prices and determining MCP based on the intersection of
supply and demand curves, units with the price higher than
MCP do not enter the market. Application of metaheuristic
algorithms in facilitating the process is to achieve the best
and closest optimal solution in large and complex problems
with a little calculation time. Each unit is allowed to offer
three bids. So the number of different scenarios for the
market on July 24 is 3370 and on November 24 is 3319. It is
noteworthy that the price cap is equal to 330,000
(Rial=MW h). Iranian currency is Rial. In 2012, each one
dollar is equal to 12,260 Rials.
By performing the algorithm several times to achieve
optimal tuning parameters, the parameters are determined
as shown in Table 1. In this research, we performed the
model with GA to get the Nash equilibrium about 30 times
to achieve optimal tuning parameters. Sivanandam and
Deepa (2008) say that the efficiency of GA to reach global
optimum is largely determined by the size of the popula-
tion. Practically, a population size of around 100 individ-
uals is quite frequent, but anyway this size can be changed
according to the time and the memory disposed on the
machine. So, we ran GA with population sizes of 100, 200,
300, 400 and 500 with different crossover and mutation
probabilities with respect to the huge size of the problem.
The results showed that the population size of 300 was
optimal. In addition, after not reaching the optimal strategy
by performing the algorithm many times with one level of
cross over and mutation parameters, we deduced that we
should use crossover and mutation probabilities and
mutation rate in some levels. In this paper, we gradually
decreased the amount of crossover probability and
increased the amount of mutation probability and rate
simultaneously to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
Short-term marginal cost of power plants
Information of fuel, heat value (HV) and heating rate (HR)
for every power plant is extracted from document of
‘‘Detailed statistics of power generation in Iran’’ (Tavanir
Expert Holding Company 2013). As the plants use several
fuels (gasoline, fuel oil and natural gas), heating value and
fuel consumptions of generation units are formulated in as
the weighted average. Energy balance document is used to
specify fuel price of plants (Ministry of Energy 2013).
Variable maintenance cost of plants is also provided by
Iran Grid Management Company.
Peak hour electricity market on November 24, 2012
(18:00)
The electricity market on November 24 included several
types of plants: 21 % steam power plants, 9 % combined
cycle of steam Power Plants, 27 % gas power plants and
43 % combined cycle of gas power plants. Simulation of
electricity market in this day is performed in two ways:
• In the first state, plants are allowed to choose any desired
generation quantity and only one of their choices should
be equal to the maximum of their power.
• In the second state, generation units are required to
choose their maximum power with different prices for
each of their three bids.
According to calculated MCs for all allowed units in this
day, the supply curve in the state of competitive equilib-
rium in which proposed prices are equal to units’ MCs and
their quantities of generation are equal to their maximum
power is drawn. The minimum and maximum power of
Table 1 Tuning parameters of genetic algorithm
Initial population to run the algorithm 300
Cross over information
Cross over probability (for 150 initial steps) 0.5
Cross over probability (from step 151 to 400) 0.1
Cross over probability (from step 401 to 500) 0
Probability of single point cross over 0.2
Probability of double point cross over 0.8
Mutation information
Mutation probability (for 150 initial steps) 0.5
Mutation probability (from step 151 to 400) 0.8
Mutation probability (from step 401 to 500) 0.9
Impact rate of mutation (for 150 initial steps) 0.05
Impact rate of Mutation (from step 151 to 400) 0.01
Impact rate of Mutation (from step 401 to 500) 0.06
Termination condition of the algorithm
Fabsj  100; 000 Rial/MWhð Þ
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plants was collected through the Energy ministry site (Iran
Grid Management Co. 2012a, b). In addition, the real
market supply curve is drawn according to the real amounts
of units’ proposed prices and quantities (Iran Grid Man-
agement Co. 2012a, b).
The first case MCP in resulting Nash equilibrium is
equal to 192,846 (Rial=MW h) and 212 units of 319 gen-
eration units produce energy and 107 power units at this
time of market are off. Combination percent of allowed
plants in the Nash equilibrium in this day is 27 % steam
power plants, 11 % combined cycle of steam Power Plants,
17 % gas power plants and 45 % combined cycle of gas
power plants. By comparing these data with the actual data
of plants in Iran electricity market, it is specified that after
obtaining the market Nash equilibrium, a large number of
107 unallowable power generation units are gas and com-
bined cycle of gas plants. Table 2 shows the numbers and
percentages of offline and unallowable plants.
Figure 8 shows supply curves of the Nash equilibrium,
the real market and the competitive equilibrium on
November 24, 2012.
In the real Iran market in which the pricing mechanism
is pay-as-bid, generating companies tend to propose their
prices more than their MCs and near to the price cap to
achieve more profit. As shown in Fig. 9, many generators
have bid their prices near to 330,000 (Rial=MW h). Lost
welfare or economic efficiency in the real market of Iran at
the peak hour on November 24, 2012 is equal to
5,191,815,809 Rials. In addition, the lost welfare in the
Nash equilibrium is equal to 1,872,871,680 Rials. So, the
economic efficiency or social welfare of Nash equilibrium
is 2.77 times as much as the real market.
The second case when the plants should offer their
maximum power with different prices, MCP is equal to
178,113 (Rial=MW h). 184 power plants are in startup
mode and 135 power units do not have permission to
generate energy at this hour of the market. Combination
percent of allowed plants in the Nash equilibrium in this
day is 33 % steam power plants, 13 % combined cycle of
steam Power Plants, 11 % gas power plants and 43 %
combined cycle of gas power plants. Numbers and per-
centages of offline plants based on their performance have
been shown in Table 3.
Figure 9 shows the supply curve of the Nash equilib-
rium market, the real market and the competitive equilib-
rium market on November 24, 2012.
The lost welfare of Iran wholesale electricity market on
November 24, 2012 is equal to 5,191,815,809 Rials and the
lost welfare of Nash equilibrium is 1,444,323,868 Rials.
Therefore, the efficiency or social welfare of Nash equi-
librium is 3.6 times as much as the real market.
Peak hour electricity market on July 24, 2012
(21:00)
Due to the demand of 37,361 MW in this hour of market,
all plants should generate at their maximum power to
response this amount of demand. In regard to ability of



















Fig. 8 Supply curve of Nash and competitive equilibrium and real
market on November 24 (first case)
Fig. 9 Supply curve of Nash and competitive equilibrium and real
market on November 24 (second Case)
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each unit to offer three bids, many Nash equilibriums are
achieved and one of them is reviewed in this paper. There
are 81 steam power plants (22 %), 34 combined cycle of
steam power plants (9 %), 100 gas power plants (27 %)
and 155 combined cycle of gas power plants (42 %) in the
electricity market on July 24. Figure 10 shows supply
curves of Nash equilibrium, the real market and the com-
petitive equilibrium in the market of July 24, 2011.
MCP is equal to 329,907 (Rial=MW h) which is
approximately close to the price cap. This price is much
higher than the prices on November 24. Regard to the high
demand and confidence of the plants about their genera-
tions with maximum power, increasing of bidding prices
does not lead to the financial loss for them and does not
force them to leave the market. Therefore, the MCP is
coming closer to the price cap. The lost welfare in the Nash
equilibrium is equal to 4,248,683,115 Rials and for the real
market is equal to 8,488,258,338 Rials. It shows that the
economic efficiency or social welfare of the Nash equi-
librium is about 2 times as much as the real market.
As mentioned above, generating units bid their proposed
prices close to the price cap to gain more profits in pay-as-
bid pricing mechanism. But at the peak hours that all plants
should generate at their maximum power to respond to the
demand, the generators’ profits gained in the Nash equi-
librium with the uniform pricing mechanism are equal to or
even more than the profits in pay-as-bid. So, the uniform
mechanism has the advantages of both more economic
efficiency or social welfare and much generations’ profits
than the pay-as-bid at the peak hours that all plants have to
generate at their maximum power. Comparison of the
profits of generators in the Nash equilibrium (uniform
pricing) with the real market (pay-as-bid) is shown in
Fig. 11. The summation of profits in the Nash equilibrium
is 739,055,784 Rials more than the real market.
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper presents a new approach to model optimal
bidding strategies in the electric power industries using
Nash equilibrium concept and genetic algorithm and per-
forms it in Iran electricity market. In addition, it computes
the lost welfares of the Nash equilibrium with the uniform
pricing mechanism and the real market with the pay-as-bid
mechanism according to the competitive equilibrium and
then compares them together. Using practical data, the
proposed model is applied to the wholesale electricity
market of Iran in 2012. Implementing this model is prac-
tically impossible for all days. Hence, two specific models
that characterize the minimum and maximum demands of
Iran’s market in 2012 have been considered. The results of
simulations indicate the MCPs, number of allowed units
and profit of each unit on both November 24 and July 24,
2012. It was observed that in the Nash equilibrium on
November 24, there is 212 allowed plants for the first case
(plants are allowed to choose any quantity of generation
except one of them that should be equal to maximum




















Fig. 10 Supply curve of Nash and competitive equilibrium and real
market on July 24, 2012
Fig. 11 Comparison of the profits of Nash equilibrium with the real
market on July 24, 2012
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Power) and 184 for the second case (plants should offer
their maximum power with different prices); on July 24, all
370 plants should generate maximum energy due to the
high electricity demand. There is a significant difference
between lost welfare of the Nash equilibrium and the real
market. Table 4 shows the results of simulations.
MCP on July 24 is much higher than on November 24.
Due to the high demand of market on July 24 and con-
fidence of the plants about their generations with maxi-
mum power, increasing of bidding prices does not lead to
the financial loss for them and does not force them to
leave the market. Therefore, the MCP is coming closer to
the price cap than on November 24. In addition, at the
peak hours that all plants should generate at their maxi-
mum power like the case on July 24, the generators’
profits gained in the Nash equilibrium with the uniform
pricing mechanism are equal to or even more than the
profits in pay-as-bid. So, the uniform mechanism have the
advantages of both more economic efficiency or social
welfare and much generations’ profits than the pay-as-bid
at the peak hours that all units should generate at their
maximum power.
Future researches can be done for the dynamic states. It
means, we should calculate the Nash equilibrium for a 24-h
electricity market instead of 1-h market.
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